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IntroduCtIon
The emergence of the novel coronavirus 
disease (COVID-19) in China has resulted 
in catastrophic events that echo worldwide. 
Primary care physicians are carrying some 
of the burden of managing the epidemic 
alongside secondary care, which is strug-
gling to maintain a concerted effort in the 
face of the mounting pressure of cases. 
Epidemics affect communities not only 
biologically but also psychosocially. General 
practitioners (GPs) in the UK are well posi-
tioned to deliver care via a ‘whole- person, 
holistic approach’ as they are the first point 
of contact and provide continuity of care 
within communities. By reviewing histor-
ical epidemics in different countries, we 
may be able to address the current issues 
in worldwide by providing pragmatic solu-
tions. In the UK, the successful response to 
the influenza and severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) epidemics was a result 
of effective collaboration between different 
organisations. Primary care services were 
considered a key player in delivering care 
as well as promoting protective behaviours 
to prevent the spread of infection. Effective 
communication, trust and the existence of 
primary care physicians within networks 
of allied health professionals allows for a 
variety of delivery mechanisms that offload 
pressures from GPs and ensure continuity of 
care. There is a need to evaluate the current 
epidemic to understand the challenges it 
poses. Finally, we recommend several solu-
tions, one of which is a thorough assessment 
of the current community services and their 
ability to collaborate with GPs to jointly 
deliver care to their communities.
The WHO initially declared the corona-
virus outbreak as ‘a global health emergency’ 
on 30 January 2020. On 11 March, the situ-
ation was declared ‘a pandemic’. The novel 
coronavirus disease, designated as COVID-19, 
is a new strain of coronavirus that emerged 
in Wuhan at the end of 2019. The numbers 
infected and deaths have increased dramati-
cally worldwide and resulted from human- to- 
human transmission.
This is not the first viral pandemic the world 
has witnessed. There has been epidemic 
experience with Ebola, SARS, Middle East 
respiratory syndrome (MERS) and pandemic 
experience with influenza. The lessons learnt 
by different countries have allowed us all 
to become better informed with deploying 
emergency responses to epidemics. Such 
outbreaks bring devastating circumstances to 
patients, their families and communities. We 
offer our experiences in the UK to provide 
possible solutions to alleviate this crisis as well 
as others that may occur in the future.
In this commentary, we offer our experi-
ences as primary care professionals in the UK 
as opportunities to inform others of alterna-
tive approaches that may help assuage their 
current burden during this difficult crisis. In 
order to provide these proposed solutions 
and recommendations, we need to discuss 
the organisation of the NHS and other sectors 
to set the directorial framework required to 
mount a structured emergency response. We 
also deem it necessary to discuss the expe-
riences and challenges faced by the UK in 
responding to previous epidemics for lessons 
learnt. The role of primary care in epidemic 
management is also discussed and, finally, we 
offer our recommendations to the primary 
care system in optimising their preparedness 
for emergency response to the current coro-
navirus epidemic as well as future epidemics.
Impact of epidemics on communities
From a bio–psycho–social perspective, 
epidemics can wreak havoc at the time they 
appear as well as long after they have gone. 
They may cause or worsen mental health in 
patients and their families due to stress and 
anxiety. Patients may lose family members 
resulting in grief and trauma. Those with 
co- morbidities or ill- health are more prone 
to dying in epidemics and this can be painful 
for their carers who look after them along 
with support from the social care sector. Busi-
ness continuity plans constitute a mandatory 
aspect of emergency preparedness planning 
for epidemics due to the massive disrup-
tion caused when quarantines and travel 
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restrictions are applied. Public transport, schools and 
workplaces may also be closed down for quarantine ulti-
mately resulting in the country slowing down to a stand-
still. This can impact a country’s economy and may take 
a while for it to recover. It is clear that the effects of an 
epidemic cascade through society in a variety of ways. 
Primary care services need to take responsibility and play 
a crucial role in the epidemic crisis because they are well- 
positioned to not only address bio–psycho–social issues 
at the helm of the crisis but also afterwards. This is due 
to the fact that they are the regular point of contact for 
patients and communities and are able to offer on going 
advice and support. Trust plays a critical role in epidemics 
and general practitioners (GPs) and their primary care 
teams are trusted by their patients and communities to 
provide good quality care. This allows primary care staff 
to be a voice of reason that will be listened to in unnerved 
communities, hereby promoting a sense of calm, confi-
dence and increased adherence to public health messages 
on protective behaviours.
organisation of the nHS
The Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) is 
responsible for preparing and leading a response. It 
also plays in an important role in activating emergency 
response protocols via informing the Cabinet Office, 
which initiates a meeting with the four Chief Medical 
Officers (CMOs) for England, Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Wales. The CMOs play a major role in 
pandemic response, as they are the most senior govern-
ment advisers on issues pertaining to health. The Chief 
Scientific Adviser to the DHSC also plays a significant role 
by advising the CMO by providing independent advice to 
ensure policies are supported with science. The Cabinet 
Office also notifies other government departments and 
works closely with DHSC throughout the epidemic to 
keep government and the public informed of develop-
ments. This communication occurs via the DHSC media 
centre or, in cases of extended and austere events, the 
Government News Coordination Centre. Pandemic 
preparedness in England allows the Secretary of State for 
Health to have a clear line of communication to frontline 
response, which includes primary care services. Public 
Health England (PHE) plays a fundamental role in diag-
nostics, analysis, monitoring and screening among other 
deliverables. It works closely with local authorities, clin-
ical commissioning groups (CCGs) and primary care to 
ensure plans are in place and guidance is up- to- date. NHS 
England carries responsibility for numerous pandemic 
preparedness and response activities.1
The response of the health system is also governed by 
statutory requirements and the bedrock of emergency 
preparedness, resilience and response. Under the Civil 
Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004 statutory requirements, 
Category 1 responders (primary responders) are organ-
isations at the core of the emergency response and these 
comprise; DHSC, NHS England, PHE, acute service 
providers, ambulance services and local authorities which 
includes Directors of Public Health. Category 2 responders 
(supporting agencies) are expected to work closely with 
Category 1 organisations to optimise the response and 
this is the role of the CCGs. Primary care services are not 
included in the CCA 2004 but are expected to respond 
with a level that is pertinent to the scale of the event.2
International collaboration with PHE plays an important 
role to ensure the UK responds appropriately to interna-
tional requests from the WHO. Furthermore, it allows the 
UK to gather intelligence from other countries to provide 
a framework for initial assessment nationally. It also offers 
the UK with an opportunity to contribute to the interna-
tional arena via collaborations and assessments.3
Epidemic experience in the uK
Previous epidemics, such as SARS in 2003, provided valu-
able lessons. The important role of strong central lead-
ership and organisation is paramount to navigate such 
crises. In addition, the existence of the Health Protection 
Agency reference laboratory in rapidly diagnosing cases 
with laboratory confirmation is also deemed requisite. 
Effective and timely communication with the public was 
vital in raising awareness and mitigating risks via public 
education on reducing transmission. However, some gaps 
were identified which included the lack of a national and 
up- to- date database of identified cases and the protection 
of staff handling samples in the reference laboratory.4
The Pandemic Influenza Response Plan and Strategic 
Framework documents3 5 (2014) developed by PHE 
provide extensive information on how a PHE- driven 
response would address the influenza pandemic. The 
documents focus on clear communication between 
different directorates and agencies, their designated 
responsibilities and business continuity planning. The 
Pandemic Influenza Response Plan 2014 document also 
discusses the important work being undertaken in math-
ematical modelling of future epidemics or pandemics 
to address the challenge of uncertainty that the UK and 
other countries face. Historically, the UK has used five 
response phases; detection, assessment, treatment, esca-
lation and recovery (DATER) to underpin the strategic 
approach it takes to tackle the influenza epidemic. In 
the current COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed strategy 
phases are: containment, delay, research and mitigate. It 
is unclear why this response has changed but interesting 
to note that the response adopted by the UK differs 
from other countries, such as China and Singapore, that 
have undertaken a more stringent approach with early 
travel restriction policies and whole- country quarantine 
measures.
The challenges faced by the UK in managing the influ-
enza pandemic were dealing with the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of the future viral outbreak.3 In addition, 
the managing of surge and escalation decision- making 
procedures was a challenge and work continues around 
this.6 In 2016, the UK’s influenza pandemic preparedness 
was exercised with NHS England participating in ‘Exer-
cise Cygnus’. It ran over 7 weeks and assumed a severe 
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pandemic outbreak with an overwhelmed service and 
reduced staff numbers. Plans were revised to incorporate 
the learning from this training.6
Effective communication during an epidemic is para-
mount to organise and coordinate a successful response 
between responsible health agencies but also plays an 
important role in preventing negative public reactions 
to epidemics as well as increasing compliance in imple-
menting recommended behavioural advice to reduce the 
risk of viral transmission. A review by Bich and Mishie 
(2010)7 highlighted the demographic and attitudinal 
factors associated with adopting protective behaviours 
during a pandemic and these are; being female, older 
or more educated. This allows a tailored and targeted 
campaign towards higher risk populations. Another 
important component of effective communication is 
gaining trust in order to maintain the integrity of infor-
mation being provided by health services/authorities 
to ensure the public adheres to advice given. There are 
principles to effective communication that include trans-
parency, clear and simple announcements, the acknowl-
edgement of uncertainty, communication of risk in 
negative framing as well as the timing of communication.8
the role of primary care
The value of primary care in responding to an epidemic 
crisis has been highlighted by Scott et al9 in their critique 
of the Ebola epidemic response in West Africa through 
a primary healthcare approach. The importance of a 
strong, well- organised health system with primary care 
centred as the first point of contact for communities 
as a consistent source of care was emphasised. Trust in 
primary care and the health system as a whole was also 
identified as a pivotal factor for community engagement 
and adherence to protective behaviours.9
The government response is changing rapidly. At the 
time of writing this commentary, the public are being asked 
to stay at home and self- isolate if they have a fever or dry 
cough and not to attend their GP, pharmacies or hospitals. 
The recommended duration of self- isolation has changed 
from 2 weeks to 7 days. Health promotion in the form of 
hand- washing, social distancing and self- isolation is being 
advertised in mass communication. Diagnostic testing is 
arranged by the local Health Protection Team (HPT) in 
different settings; hospitals, designated hubs or patients’ 
homes. More specifically in primary care, measures must 
be put in place to reinforce the government’s approach. 
Examples include pre- recorded automated messages on 
telephone systems and screening questions on entry into 
the practice. Some practices have adopted a closed- door 
policy. Furthermore, GPs are advised to telephone triage 
all patients with suspension of face- to- face appointments. 
If a case is suspected on telephone triage, then the course 
of action depends on the severity of symptoms. For mild 
illness, patients are re- directed to contact 111. For severe 
disease or critically unwell patients, the GP will arrange 
an ambulance and alert the local HPT. Healthcare profes-
sionals in primary care are donning personal protective 
equipment (PPE) as standard practice. If patients are 
identified as suspected cases during face- to- face consul-
tations undertaken for any reason, the healthcare profes-
sional must leave the room, change their PPE and ask 
the patient to call 111 with deep cleaning of the room 
afterwards.10
The current structure of primary care may play a role in 
pandemic response. As part of the NHS Long Term Plan 
2019, GP practices now sit within Primary Care Networks 
(PCNs), which serve populations of between 30 000 and 
50 000 patients. Within these PCNs, GP practices work 
more closely alongside other practices as well as allied 
health professionals/services that include, but are not 
limited to; clinical pharmacists, paramedics, advanced 
nurse practitioners, link workers for social prescribing 
and others. GPs are well embedded within the commu-
nity and are able to function within a multi- disciplinary 
team to provide holistic care by looking at the patient 
as a whole. The working relationship may be useful for 
swift communication updates at the primary care level 
between organisations. However, the majority of cases will 
be managed in secondary care.
Primary care receives direct communication from 
NHS England and the local CCG regarding PHE guid-
ance and updates on pandemics. At this current time, 
GPs are receiving information about COVID-19 with 
advice and guidance on how to manage suspected 
cases and where to refer, with local support provision 
from public health specialists. However, this guidance 
is rapidly changing. An example of the first protocol 
for management of COVID-19 in primary care can be 
found in figure 1.11
The delivery of services in an epidemic by primary care 
professionals is multi- faceted and operates similarly to 
day- to- day practice but under regular updates on advice 
and guidance from PHE. GPs triage patient calls to deter-
mine whether a face- to- face appointment is appropriate. 
Telemedicine has a major role to play in this current 
pandemic as GPs are opting to use video consultations 
where feasible. If the patient is deemed possibly infected 
with a virus causing an epidemic, they are advised to 
remain indoors and are offered disease prevention advice 
and symptom relief self- help measures. Nurses, healthcare 
assistants, advanced nurse practitioners, clinical phar-
macists and clinical paramedics all work in GP practices 
and are also frontline in offering this advice. If a patient 
attends the practice and is deemed to be a suspected case 
of infection, then they are isolated in a room with their 
belongings, clinical examinations are not undertaken and 
the local HPT is called for further advice. In addition to 
this multi- disciplinary team within a GP practice setting, 
community pharmacies, dental clinics and optometrists 
form the remainder of primary care services. They are 
also resources of advice for the public and follow PHE 
guidance on epidemics similar to GP practices. Finally, in 
the context of out- of- hours, patients are able to contact 
NHS 111 for advice from protocol- guided telephone 
handlers and GPs.
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Figure 1 Public Health England (PHE) guidance flowchart for management of coronavirus in primary care.11 PPE, personal 
protective equipment.
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The health and social sector in the UK work closely 
together. For example, services such as nursing homes 
are supported by GPs and their staff provide the GP with 
insight into the social needs of the patient to provide a 
‘whole- person, holistic approach’ in managing a patient. 
In epidemics, this working relationship proves useful as 
a resource to help detect suspected cases early by having 
social care sector staff alert the GP for a swift clinical 
response and assessment to be undertaken with support 
from the local HPT. This relationship is especially 
important for early testing and isolation of suspected 
cases to reduce transmission within multi- morbid and 
elderly populations that constitute the bulk of social care 
institutions.
Primary care plays a critical role in all historical five 
phases of DATER by drawing on the variety of its allied 
health services and professionals within the community 
to provide support throughout these phases. Specific 
to the recovery phase, staff working within primary 
care services are offered support following an epidemic 
including psychological support. Furthermore, primary 
care service providers are the frontline staff responsible 
for giving appropriate advice involving self- quarantine, 
self- help measures and education on reduction of trans-
mission in the community. The close working relation-
ship of primary and social care is integral to help provide 
professional advice as well as support to social care 
services to help mitigate the risks of viral transmission via 
health promotion and patient education. Therefore, not 
only is primary care pivotal in detecting and managing 
cases early, but also extremely vital in prevention and 
health promotion within the community by supporting 
mass communication delivered by DHSC, PHE and NHS 
England.
In current time and within the framework of the four 
proposed phases, primary care has had a role in the 
containment and delay phases to date, with more emphasis 
on reduction of transmission by good hygiene measures 
(hand washing, and catch it, bin it, kill it), wearing PPE, 
switching to telephone triage as well as telemedicine and 
re- iterating government advice on self- quarantine and 
isolation. This outbreak has highlighted the role of digital 
communication, different ways of working and handling 
large unexpected events that will need to be evaluated in 
primary care. The relevant COVID-19 research in primary 
care will play an important role in gathering evidence 
about effective interventions and management in order 
to inform decision- making going forward and guide prac-
tice. The UK Government will keep emerging research 
needs under close review and progress research activities 
set out. Based on the understanding of the Mitigate phase- 
next steps in DHSC report12 (3 March, 2020), primary 
care will continue to play important roles in this phase, 
such as in further publicity of advice to individuals about 
protecting themselves and others; integrating with social 
care services to support early discharge from hospital, and 
to look after people in their own homes; dealing with the 
increase in deaths arising from the outbreak; providing 
residents and GP practice staff psychological support for 
the pressure raised at work, as well as potentially their 
own personal illness or caring responsibilities.
Emphasis must be made on frontline staff well- being 
from both a mental and physical health point of view. 
Testing of suspected staff members must be highlighted 
and contact tracing deployed if they test positive. Primary 
care cannot afford to have infected staff members quar-
antined for up to 2 weeks as this will create a higher work-
load on other staff members and may possibly reduce 
primary care’s ability to respond swiftly. Furthermore, 
and most importantly, pandemic situations can result in 
frontline staff feeling overwhelmed. Steps must be taken 
to ensure they are well supported by ensuring that all staff 
members able to work are deployed, that the appropriate 
level of PPE is available and that services are available for 
mental health support. Social media seems to be playing 
an active role in the UK by providing regular updates on 
the situation between staff members, especially GPs, along 
with public health promotion advice and mental well- 
being advice focussing on meditation and mindfulness 
practice. Risk stratification for frontline staff members is 
also required for those at increased risk of having poorer 
outcomes if infected with COVID-19, such as those above 
60 years of age and with co- morbidities. Risk stratification 
measures can include re- deployment from front line activ-
ities and if not feasible, then adopting strict telemedicine- 
only policies for those at risk.
The challenges relevant to primary care in the UK, are 
the shortage of staff despite the variety of providers within 
the community. Furthermore, demographics vary greatly 
within the UK and some demographics such as elderly 
populations; high burden of chronic disease and lower 
socio- economic status groups may pose a challenging 
demand for care by the existing primary care services. 
Over the preceding years, the NHS 111 service has been 
improved to help non- clinicians direct patients to the 
appropriate service provider by using protocols and 111 
has been a major role player in this current pandemic 
alongside secondary care and ambulance services in 
responding to cases requiring treatment. This can be 
adopted in other countries to help alleviate the demand 
burden from clinicians by providing a telephone advice 
and guidance service to the community.
rECommEndatIonS
Based on the UK’s experiences and challenges in the past 
and in the context of how the primary care sector is set 
up, we put forth the following recommendations to the 
other primary care service and its department of health.
1. Re- organisation of GPs to operate within a network with 
other allied health professionals and the social sector 
to allow for delegation within epidemic situations.
2. Provision of support to GPs throughout and after deal-
ing with an epidemic by the local responsible health 
department.
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3. Utilisation of effective and transparent communica-
tion between primary care and its responsible depart-
ment within the health system.
4. Deployment of telephone triage staff trained for epi-
demic case management and health promotion to off-
load the burden of demand from GPs.
5. Development of clear and easy- to- follow national stan-
dardised health promotion materials and efficient 
communication channel for public in order to en-
hance public awareness and self- quarantine.
6. Provision of up- to- date advice and guidance from pub-
lic health authorities to GPs and the public with local 
public health support provision.
7. Rigorous assessment of the capacity of existing com-
munity services coordinating with GPs to develop clear 
pathways and responsibilities in case management.
8. Evaluate current epidemic to learn from the challeng-
es it posed.
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